Monday, October 12, 2015

Interest Rates and the Shadow of the Future

There’s an interesting quote from Axel Weber, one of Germany’s most influential economists, transmitted by Dean Baker this morning:
“When I travel around the world, I find hardly anyone supporting the Fed’s policy on interest rates,” said a senior European official, who did not want to be publicly identified criticizing the I.M.F. “The fund has become very short-term-oriented."
I hear this a lot.  Stimulative monetary policy, in the spirit of the dissolute John Maynard Keynes, is all about living it up in the present and hardly giving a thought to what follows.  Remember Niall Ferguson and the “quip” about Keynes not caring about the next generation because he was gay and wouldn’t have any?

The funny thing is that I am just preparing a lecture on natural resource policy where the central variable, of course, is the discount rate.  Low rates put more emphasis on the future, high rates on the here and now.  And that’s true for all investment, whether in nature, produced capital or human capital.  It’s what r is fundamentally about.  Low r stimulates economies by encouraging more spending on investment.

People who’ve already amassed a lot of money and want to earn a return on it—creditors—like high interest rates.  The rest of us, who either borrow money to invest or depend on a robust economy for jobs and higher wages, see things the other way around.  But in the end, a lower r gives more weight to the future.  It’s about as basic an economic truth as you’ll ever find.

Sunday, October 11, 2015

Disclosure of What?

A comment to my last post, on the Litan affair and the importance of disclosure, has got me thinking.  As was point out, Litan had disclosed his funding; what he hadn’t disclosed was that his funder had commissioned the work.  This raises the larger question of what sorts of disclosure ought to be required.  A researcher’s relationship to external interests is not a binary, yes-no matter; there are multiple levels.

The obvious answer, how much money changed hands, is not very informative, in my opinion.  A lot of funding can be earmarked for expenses, and even the meaning of an “expense” is open.  If a professor has a course bought out, is this an expense or a benefit?

I think the question that tripped up Litan, whether the funder commissioned the work in question, is germane, although there are large ambiguities here as well.  Sometimes a researcher will go to an agency or foundation with a proposal and request that a particular piece of work be commissioned; I’ve done this myself.  But is that the same as having someone come to you, ask for a specific product and then pay you enough to convince you to do it?

For me the most important question is whether the researcher has an obligation to share results or manuscript drafts prior to public dissemination.  Whether there is a further understanding that the funder’s explicit approval is necessary to go forward may be relevant, but not necessarily.  The critical line, in my opinion, divides research with strings, like the obligation to submit drafts, from research without.  I believe it should always be specified whether a report or article was reviewed by an interested party before it was released to the public.

These are preliminary thoughts on my part, and readers may have insights I haven’t considered.

Saturday, October 10, 2015

Litany of Tainted Research

Most of what Luigi Zingales has to say about the Litan affair is right on target: reputation effects are not sufficient to prevent researchers from shading their conclusions to satisfy funders.  Litan himself was guilty of failure to disclose his sponsors, the Capital Group, for testimony he presented to Congress, irrespective of the merits or otherwise of his work: who is paying for research is relevant to forming a judgment on it, and not only whether this or that variable was properly identified.  And Senator Warren was right to call him out.

Still, there are problems of omission and commission with Zingales’ piece.  Commission #1: I strongly disagree that public funding of research raises the same issues as private.  Says Z: “Eliminating private funding will leave research completely in public funding’s hands.  It will not eliminate the bias; it will simply tilt it in the direction of the government.”  Really, Zingales has been hanging out in Chicago too long.  As a sometimes recipient of public funding (disclosure), I think it’s ludicrous to say that the interest of the “government” bears on how us grantees do our work.  Seriously, what government interest does NSF represent?  In any case, there is a legal basis for exposing bias and malfeasance in public research support that does not exist in the private sector.

Commission #2: “....reputational incentives work relatively well only for academic papers that circulate widely in the relevant academic community and are independently scrutinized in peer review.”  I wish.  The reality is that peer scrutiny is not a process that separates the worthy from the unworthy in an objective, reliable manner.  Just look at any journal: quite a bit of shady stuff survives peer review and gets published, even if their results are not replicable.  In addition, as any author knows, there are a myriad of detailed matters in research that can be resolved in a variety of ways.  You can push the boundaries of a category a little bit this way or that, make or not make a restrictive assumption, and so on.  Your peers are not going to write you off just because your choices lean a little in a particular direction as long as you are technically sound.  The moral of the story: disclosure of funding sources is essential for all published research, no matter how and to whom it is disseminated.

Omission: Zingales provides two suggestions for reform, advance posting of expert testimony at least two weeks before a Congressional hearing and public disclosure of the identities of expert witnesses.  But the most important reform is missing: we need a single, consolidated source of information on all publishing economists disclosing all their sources of funding.  This could be a website where any journalist, congressional staffer or interested member of the public could find out if a given author had taken money that might influence his or her work.  Beginning with the AEA, professional associations and journals could make accurate listing in this database a condition for participation or submission.  Who’s paying you should not be treated as a trade secret, not if you claim to be contributing to the store of human knowledge.

Friday, October 9, 2015

Picasso: A “Lost” Treasure

I don’t know how this Spanish case over who has custody over a Picasso portrait, the Spanish government or the billionaire owner, is going to turn out, but I heard a nice story that I’d like to pass along.

It took place at an outdoor café, I believe along the Riviera.  Picasso was at a table chatting with a family.  The family wanted show the Great Man their daughter’s artwork, so, with the little girl at the table, they pulled out one of her creations.  Picasso examined it and said, “Yes, but let’s see another way of doing it.  We could begin like this,” and he began drawing on a napkin.  He made a few lines, said a bit more, then drew more.  Soon an elegant sketch was taking form.  Meanwhile, all eyeballs from the surrounding tables had turned toward Picasso and especially this napkin.  What would it be worth?

Picasso discussed his drawing with the girl, pointing out how a few strokes of a pencil could stand in for a lot more detail.  But then, looking around to his expanded audience, he added, “But enough about me!  What about you?  Let’s see you draw something else!”  And with that, he shredded his napkin into little pieces.

I heard this second-hand from someone who claimed they knew someone who was there.  The specifics may be wrong, or maybe the whole story is apocryphal.  If any readers can pin it down, I’d appreciate it.

Where Does the Minimum Wage Max Out?

Alan Krueger says we should set a nationwide wage floor no higher than $12/hr, since that’s as far as our research knowledge extends.  We know that a statutory minimum at that level will have little or no employment impact, but anything above that is beyond empirical familiarity—we just don’t know.  He is open to cities, where wages and living costs are higher, to experiment with higher wage floors, but not the Feds.

Far be it from me to dispute Krueger, who, with David Card, launched the revolution in empirical minimum wage studies a generation ago, finding in the process that he has become a poster boy for quasi-experimental methods.  Good for him!  But I don’t think his inference from the existing research is warranted, for three reasons.

1. From a policy perspective, the minimum wage could be set either too low or too high.  It would be too low if large gains in equity, poverty reduction and economic dynamism could be achieved at little cost in employment.  (Dynamism could take the form of innovation to offset higher labor costs.)  It would be too high if employment at the low end of the labor market were crippled.  What Krueger seems to be aiming at is a zero risk of overshooting the ideal minimum, as if there were no cost to undershooting it.  But surely, if we know that $12 is unlikely to bite back, then a proper balancing of risks should take us somewhere above $12.

2. A high percentage of low-wage jobs are intermittent.  People work for a while, get laid off or quit, then go back to another crapola job, and so on.  This means that a lot of the employment loss of a “too high” minimum wage simply means that workers will earn more money per hour but work fewer hours per year.  What that means for their bottom line depends on the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the wage mandate.  Even the economists on the payroll of the restaurant industry who have done battle with Card & Krueger find low elasticities, meaning that most intermittent workers would come out ahead despite longer spells of unemployment.  This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t worry about unemployment at all, but that it isn’t quite the problem it’s made out to be.

3. Even if the minimum wage is set at a level that eats into employment, this can be offset by other policies.  Macropolicy, especially on the fiscal side, should push for lower overall unemployment rates.  We should finally begin to treat all young people, especially from low income backgrounds, as the repositories of incredible potential they are, by investing in their education, skill and practical experience—there are lots of models for this.  A ramping up of skill would, over time, lead to productivity gains that would support a higher wage structure.  The point is that the minimum wage is one piece of a much larger mosaic of economic policy, and its effects differ depending on what else is being done.

So is $15 the magic number?  I don’t know.  Like Krueger would probably say, we need more research.  But what I do know is that, if $12 is very safe, the right number is higher than that.

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

Dean Baker Sends Mixed Message On Bailing Out Banks

Unfortunately I seem to be unable to provide functionng links to Dean Baker's Beat the Press, and I am overwhelmingly most of the time on board with him as beats the press for its many  errors and sins.  However, today he seems to have gotten himself confused in a post aimed not at the press but at Ben Bernanke and statements in his memor, entitled "Of course Ben Bernanke could have saved Lehman," which very accurately argues that indeed Bernanke and the Fed could have saved Lehman in September, 2008 but did not do so.  I have not read Bernanke's memoir, but I shall take it as true that Bernanke indeed makes this false claim.  So, so far so good for our usually intrepid Dean.

But there is a problem here, which several commenters on his blog have pointed out.  For years he has beaten a drum that there should have been no bank bailouts, especially not TARP.  His favored outcome was to let whatever big banks were in deep doo doo to go down, to fail, with their depositers being paid off.  Now to pay off those depositers would have certainly made the FDIC go bankrupt, but indeed probably Congress would have come through, if perhaps with some lag, and paid off all those depositers. This would have indeed probably at a minimum led to the careless and venal managements of those big banks being removed, if not necessarily being sent to jail as both Dean and Ben Bernanke also say they wished had happened (as have many of the rest of us as well).  Dean has also regularly dismissed the concerns of Bernanke that failing to bail out the big banks would lead to any further failures of banks or other problems in the financial system that might have led to a 1931 style outcome, which Bernanke feared, an outcome that did give us Adolf Hitler and all that followed (uh oh, have I broken Godwin's Rule, or whatever that is? note official self hand slap).

Now one clear reason why it might not have been as bad as 1931 was indeed that we now have the FDIC, which was not put in place until 1935.  The wave of bank failures after Fall 1931 (and before as well) wiped out the savings of many people who were not at all insured.  Probably the scale of wipeouts would not have been nearly as bad.  OTOH, the degree of interbank connectedness now around the world is much greater and more opaque when the shadow banking system is taken into account than was the case in 1931.  That global financial collapse took many months, having started in May with the failure of the Creditanstalt in Vienna, then spreading across Germany and France over the summer to UK by end of summer and finally to the US by Septermber (and on to Japan later).  It remains not widely reported, although I think Dean knows it (in fact I think he and I have personally discussed this), that the really serious thing that was going on that September was the Fed bailing out the ECB, which was having trouble propping up top German and Franch banks that were threatening to go under due to their exploding AIG problem.  This was truly an enormous mess, and the threat to the full global financial system appears to have been extreme, with all this brought on by the fall of Lehman, which Dean now says should indeed have been propped up.  I guess maybe if it had been propped up, we would not have had to prop up the rest, but who knows?

One final trivial note.  TARP ended up making money for the US Treasury.  A massive bailout of depositers in failed banks after an FDIC bankruptcy would have certainly cost the Treasry and taxpayers money, as was the csse with the S&L bailouts of an earlier decade.  But this is trivial compared to the possible losses that might have occurred if there were no bailouts of the big banks.  In any case, I think Dean has a bit of an inconsistent story going on here, whether or not Ben Bernanke did well or ill.

Barkley Rosser

Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Huffing And Puffing Ideologically Over The Export-Import Bank

Tyler Cowen at Marginal  Revolution has sympathetically linked to an article in the latest issue of Econ Journal Watch by Veronique de Rugy, Ryan Daza, and Daniel B. Klein that argues that libertarian/conservative bloggers have been frequently and firmly critical of the supposedly awful Export-Import Bank, whose charter was renewed not too long ago, even while they admit that at least a few leftist bloggers have criticized it, most notably Dean Baker, who was all over its case today (perhaps in response to this article, although he made no mention of  it or Cowen's post).

While some commenters at MR attempt to criticize the methodology of the authors, it looks to me like they are basically correct.  Dean Baker is one of the lefty bloggers to post multiple times to criticize the Export-Import Bank as a protectionist subsidizer of big corporate interests, most notably Boeing and General  Electric.  OTOH, many righty bloggers have complained about its rechartering frequently, with Donald Boudreaux at Cafe Hayek leading the pack with 72 such posts, followed by Daniel Mitchell at International Liberty at 43. For the authors this apparently shows some kind of hypocrisy by statist protectionists on the left, even though the only blogger identified as supporting the Ex-Im Bank outright is Barry Ritholtz, a professional financial adviser whom I have not yet heard of presenting talks in URPE sessions at conferences.

For the record, I agree with Dean Baker about the Ex-Im Bank.  It does not deserve to exist, and it clearly exists solely to help out some big corporate interests, even if one wants to argue as some have that workers may be involved here as well (the heart of leftist protectionist arguments).  So, why have most lefty blogs been silent on this, and I am posting on this at least partly because this blog is listed in this article as being one that has never had a post about this issue, accurately as near as I can tell, so this is the first such post.  I cannot speak for others here, but why have I not personally so posted in the past on this wicked evil big government protectionist protector of giant corporations?

Well, I had not paid much attention to it, frankly, and the main reason is simply that I have never  thought it was much of a big deal.  I have sympathy with libertarians and conservatives when they point to  the many government programs that engage in questionable activities and that also cost taxpayers a lot of money, think agricultural price support programs (although conservative politicians from agricultural states will rush to support them, and even supposedly "clean" centrists and liberals, such as the late William Proxmire of Wisconsin who when asked why he was attacking wasteful programs but supporting dairy import quotas replied that, "After all, I am the senior senator from the state of Wisconsin").  But, not  only is Ex-Im not costing a lot of money, it is making a profit.  In this regard it looks like the much-derided TARP, which I also find myself having trouble getting too worked up about.  Maybe the financial system would have been just fine without TARP and we would not have fallen into another Great Depression, but even if it had no positive effect, at least it did not cost any money in the end.

Also, in the case of its biggest beneficiary, Boeing, we are not talking about a free market.  It is part of an effective duopoly with Airbus.  And the subsidies and support from governments that Airbus gets for trade support far exceed the penny ante amounts that having slightly lower interest rates for some of its borrowing provides for Boeing.  (General Electric arguably operates in a more competitive environment).  The amounts involved are piddling, in the millions, not billions, per year, although supposedly without Ex-Im Boeing might have lost a $1.1 billion deal with South Africa.

But there is a bigger  issue here that nobody has talked about, not the authors of the articles, and not even any of the conservative or libertarian critics of Ex-Im, and for that matter, not even Dean Baker or any of the leftier critics either.  That is that both Boeing and General Electric have received much greater subsidies that do come out of the taxpayers' pockets from another source in the US government, the DOD.  Boeing is the second largest defense contracter in the US, receiving on the order of  roughly $18 billion in contracts annually, with General Electric a good deal further behind, but also receiving several billions in contracts annually as well.  Now it may be that people ignore this because they are presumably providing services, even though we know such contracts have very nice profit margins padded into them.  Conservatives may love this, but good libertarians should be down on DOD subsidies as should good lefties like Dean Baker.  This is the real subsidy the US government gives these behemoths that helps them in trade wars, not the penny ante dribblings that they get from the money-making, if indefensible, Export-Import Bank. 

I shall take all these people getting all bent out over Ex-Im, both the bloggers and these authors, more seriously when they point out these massive subsidies from the DOD.  But, I am not going to hold my breath over this.

Barkley Rosser

Sorry, David Ignatius, We Never Had Syria to "Hand Over to Putin"

Today the usually perspicacious David Ignatius in the Washington Post declares in a column labeled "Don't hand Syria over to Putin," that"simply acceding to Moscow...would be significant mistake."  Funny thing is that he follows up this statement with the probably accurate observation that "the Russians can't defeat the Islamic State."  But, escalation by Russia to bomb in Syria (as the US has  been doing for some time) might "may fuel the Sunni insurgency even more."  Maybe, but the more serious problem here is that the US has not "had" Syria ever.

The hard fact is that Russia has "had Syria" for a long time, far more than the US ever has, basically ever since the Ba'ath Party came to power in a military coup more than half a century ago over the immediate successors of the French rule after  WW II, although, of course, prior to 1991, it was the Soviet Union that "had" Syria, not Russia.  But we know that there has been a lot of continuity in terms of global interests from the old Soviet Union to the modern Russia in many places.  The Soviets and then Russians also supported Saddam in Iraq and his branch of the Ba'ath Party, Arab nationalist socialist in its ideological orientation, even as those two branches and the Assads and Saddam became enemies of  each other.  Indeed, in Putin's speech to the UN General Assembly, he complained about the US overthrow of Saddam noting that what has followed has been chaos, along with the beginning of Daesh/ISIS/ISIL/IS, the collapse of pro-Russian Libyan regime into chaos (with the division into its historically distinct eastern and western parts as I frequently forecast here on Econospeak), and the mess in Yemen. 

So, Putin has been very traditional in his approach to many parts of  the globe.  In this regard, he has focused on military bases, especially naval ones.  One can argue that Russia as a major land power should not be so focused on its navy, but this is an old concern, dating at least to Peter the Great three centuries ago when he grabbed the land from Sweden that he build Saint Petersburg on to provide a naval "Window to the West"(with this emphasized by the fact that the radial roads of the city emanate from its Admiralty Building).  A little noted aspect of Putin's seizure of Crimea is that its naval base at Sevastopol is located there, and although generally Ukraine had been "reasonable" continuing to allow Russia to hold it and use it, Putin simply got tired of having to worry about unfriendly governments in Kyiv giving him a hard  time about it.

So, the fact that few note as they bark about this awful cave by Obama is that Russia has its only naval base in the Mediterranean Sea in Syria at Tartus, a base dating well back into the Soviet period.  The US has never had a military base in Syria and has pretty much always been opposed to the Assad regime, both the current one and that of his even nastier dad.  Putin also seems to be establishing an air base in Latakia in the heart of Assad Alawite territory in the northwest of  Syria near the Russian naval base, possibly laying the groundwork for defending its base even if Assad loses power in Damascus to whomever.

Now the big difference between the US  and Russia now is indeed over Assad, who has without question been brutal, dropping barrel bombs on civilians and previously using chemical weapons.  Of course lots of people are angry with Obama did not bomb Assad for doing the latter after he declared a "red line"on that issue.  That in fact he worked with Putin to get Assad to get rid of his chemical weapons (or at least the worst of them) is barely noticed by any of these complainers.  So, when Putin argues that Assad is all there is to stand against Daesh, Obama may be taking this seriously in private, if not in public.

So, Obama's critics, including a pack of VSPs, are full of the claim that Obama should have supported earlier and more fully a "moderate" third force.  But, he did support these people pretty substantially, and all they have done is lose every battle they have fought and have a bad record of handing over their weapons (given by the US) to either al Qaeda-related al Nusra or to Daesh itself.  But VSPs, including Hillary Clinton, say things would have been great if we had done more, but I think Obama's skepticism on this was and has been proven right.

I note one more point. Russia has a more immediate concern about Daesh than does the US.  Chechens have joined Daesh, and while I do not approve of how Putin crushed the revolt in Chechnya, it is also true that Chechen Islamists have carried out major terrorist attacks in Russia.  Russian citizens are not supporting Russian troops going to Syria, but the hard fact is that Daesh is a more serious immediate threat to Russia on its homeland than it is to the US on its homeland.  Given what has happened after the removal of Saddam and Qaddafi in their nations, one can appreciate that Putin has a strong desire to "prop up Assad," and even more given their long presence in Syria with their naval base in Tartus.  The general ignoring of this fact by such generally "realist" observers like Ignatius is somewhat disturbing (and, yes, the situation in Syria is plain awful, but anybody putting forth an easy or straightforward "solution" obviously has not figured out just how complicated and messed up the situation there is).

Barkley Rosser

Unstandard Deviations

"But the burden of whiteness is this: You can live in the world of myth and be taken seriously." Ta-Nehisi Coates 
"It was only by reading – and checking – the actual data in The Bell Curve... the undisputed data..." -- Andrew Sullivan
Ta-Nehisi Coates is a Genius!

In a discussion over at Angry Bear of Coates's recent Atlantic piece on mass incarceration, one of the commenters raised the spectre of the I.Q. gap between Whites and Blacks, which is allegedly 15 I.Q. points or roughly "one standard deviation" from the norm of the reference White population.

Where does this ubiquitous "15 I.Q points" come from? Arthur Jensen, in his 1969 Harvard Educational Review article, “How Much Can We Boost I.Q. and Scholastic Achievement?” cited a 1966 (first edition, 1958) book by Audrey Shuey, The Testing of Negro Intelligence:
Negroes test about 1 standard deviation (15 I.Q. points) below the average of the white population in I.Q. and this finding is fairly uniform across the 81 tests of intellectual ability used in the studies reviewed by Shuey.
So who, then, was "Shuey"?

Dr. Audrey M. Shuey was Chairman of the Department of Psychology in the Randolph-Macon College for Women, at Lynchburg, Virginia. Dr. Shuey's mentor at Columbia University was Henry E. Garrett, a militant segregationist and hereditarian who also contributed a foreword to her book. In his 1958 review of the first edition of The Testing of Negro Intelligence, Horace Mann Bond wrote:
Never before has the literature of psychology witnessed so determined an effort to establish, as a fact, the proposition that there are "native differences between Negroes and whites as determined by intelligence tests."
By the interesting device of discarding all "interpretations, criticisms, comments," and even conclusions in individual studies, and taking the statistical tables reporting differential scores as the only, bona-fide, "results," Dr. Shuey arrives at what she calls a "remarkable consistency in test results, whether they pertain to school or pre-school children, to high school or college students, to drafts of World War I or World War II, to the gifted or the mentally deficient, to the delinquent or criminal." This "remarkable consistency" becomes the foundation of her concluding inferences that "point, to the presence of some native differences between Negroes and whites as determined by intelligence tests."
Another reviewer, Ina C. Brown, concluded her review of the book with the observation:
The book really adds up to much ado about nothing. No informed person questions the fact that on the average Whites perform better than Negroes on the tests or that northerners perform better than southerners or urban subjects better than rural subjects. It is the why that is important and Dr. Shuey’s brushing aside the interpretations of most of the recent testers in favor of her own conclusions adds nothing to our knowledge. 
One can, however, predict wide use of the book by White Citizens’ Councils and others who are in search of material which they can interpret as “scientific” support for their point of view.
The prediction that White Citizens' Councils would widely use the book was either prescient or simply well informed. Publication of the book was funded by Wickliffe Draper's Pioneer Fund, which sponsored free distribution of the book throughout the South, assisted by the Citizens' Councils. After Shuey's death, two other Pioneer Fund grantees, R. Travis Osborne and Frank McGurk, published a follow-up volume to include data from 1966 to 1982.

Now about that "actual data" Andrew Sullivan claimed to have "checked" and found "undisputed." Bullhockey. The following chart summarizes the allegedly "undisputed" data about race and I.Q. relied upon by Murray and Herrnstein in The Bell Curve. Note the sources: Shuey, Osborne and McGurk, Jensen. Why not list the sponsors, too: Pioneer Fund... White Citizens' Council... Wickliffe Draper... Henry Garrett?

Undisputed data? Virtually every aspect of the race and I.Q. data cited by Murray and Herrnstein -- along with its hereditarian interpretation -- has been not only disputed but refuted. Voluminously.

The only aspect left "undisputed" is that there are differences in I.Q. scores. But by itself that "fact" is trivial and meaningless. It is like saying a dollar is worth 100 cents because each cent is worth one-hundredth of a dollar. The logic is circular.

How could Sullivan have "checked" the data in The Bell Curve and yet be unaware of the extensive critiques of the data by such authorities as Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin or Leon Kamin?

Undisputed data? Seriously? A better description for "the actual data in The Bell Curve" and the way in which it was presented would be fraudulent. In his 1995 review of the book, Michael Nunley called it "too smooth to be true":
Their fraud begins in their introduction with a series of astonishing assertions. They list a number of propositions they claim form the very foundation of their book, but for which they tell us they are not going to provide any evidence. These include such notions as that there is such a thing as general cognitive ability; that IQ is the most accurate measure of it; and that IQ tests are not biased against any social, economic, ethnic, or racial groups. They are excused from providing any evidence for these assertions because, as they put it, these statements are "beyond significant technical dispute." This struck me as odd because, you see, I’m an anthropologist with an interest in cross-cultural studies of cognition. And if I were trying to think of things that might be considered "beyond technical dispute" from cross-cultural studies in anthropology, they would be that human cognition is far too complex to be captured on a simple linear scale; that IQ measures only a very narrow band of all kinds of cognitive achievement; and that tests of cognitive achievement cannot avoid being culturally biased by the content, materials, and style of testing used. 
In an afterword to the 2010 edition of The Bell Curve, Charles Murray dismissed -- with a few well placed "never minds" -- criticism by Charles Lane and Leon Kamin of the book's extensive dependence on "tainted sources":
Never mind that The Bell Curve draws its evidence from more than a thousand scholars... Never mind that the relationship between the founder of the Pioneer Fund and today's Pioneer Fund is roughly analogous to that between Henry Ford and today's Ford Foundation.
It is, of course, impossible to refute a "never mind" that declines to substantiate the evidence for the claims that it sarcastically asserts will be ignored anyway.

Never mind that more than 995 of Murray's "more than a thousand scholars" are irrelevant to the five studies cited in The Bell Curve's analysis of differences between Black and White cognitive test scores, three of which come from books and articles by Pioneer Fund sponsored authors.

Never mind that Murray offered no rationale or evidence for his spurious analogy between the Ford Foundation and the Pioneer Fund.

Never mind that Murray's "refutation" of the charge that the book relied on "tainted sources" was a non sequitur and a red herring. Murray's coy "never minds" are, to use Nunley's description, "too smooth to be true":
When I first sat down to read Herrnstein and Murray’s book The Bell Curve (1994), I was predisposed to be skeptical of certain positions I’d heard it was promoting, but I was nevertheless expecting it to be an honest attempt to make a case for a wrongheaded but sincerely held scientific position.  But when I read the text of The Bell Curve, including its footnotes, which were stuck at the back of the book, forcing me to page back and then forward again every paragraph or two, with all the book’s references buried well back in the footnotes, and when I then tracked down and read some of the references to see what they actually said and what other scholars had said about them, I became convinced that The Bell Curve is something quite different from my initial expectation. I believe this book is a fraud, that its authors must have known it was a fraud when they were writing it, and that Charles Murray must still know it’s a fraud as he goes around defending it. By “fraud,” I mean a deliberate, self-conscious misrepresentation of the evidence. After careful reading, I cannot believe its authors were not acutely aware of what they were including and what they were leaving out, and of how they were distorting the material they did include. The book is, moreover, a very good fraud, a very cleverly constructed one. There aren’t enough "o"s in “smooth” to describe it.
Ta-Nehisi Coates is a Genius.

Coates's Atlantic feature story on mass incarceration commences with a discussion of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1965 report, "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action." Toward the end of his account of the Moynihan report, Coates mentions that "William Ryan, the psychologist who first articulated the concept of 'blaming the victim,' accused Moynihan’s report of doing just that."

Toward the end of his article, Coates returns to Moynihan and briefly alludes to his 'ominous" citation of "a 'rather pronounced revival -- in impeccably respectable circles -- of the proposition that there is a difference in genetic potential' between the two races." Moynihan noted the proposition in March 1969 report to Nixon regarding Arthur Jensen's Harvard Educational Review article.

Impeccably respectable circles.

Undisputed data.


Saturday, September 26, 2015

Cruz Wrongly Declares Death On Iran's Leader

Senator Ted Cruz has just promised that if he becomes President of the United States he will do all he can to bring about the death of the current Head of State of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its Vilayat-el-faqih, or "Supreme Jurisprudent,"  Ali Khameini. It is true that he was not popularly elected, in contrast to Iran's President, Mahmoud Rouhani, but he is indeed the Commander-in-Chief of its military, which is what is crucial for the matter of nuclear weapons policy, which, presumably, is why Cruz wants to off him.

Apparently Cruz is unaware of the fact that after Iran halted its nuclear weapons program after the US invaded Iraq over a decade ago, Khameini issued fatwas against nuclear weapons, which are still in place.  As it is, if Cruz is aware of this, he probably believes that Khameini was lying when he issued those fatwas, even though official US National Intelligence Estimates supported by all 17 publicly known US intelligence agencies have agreed that Iran has not had an active nuclear weapons program since 2003.

Frankly, at this point in time, Senator Cruz looks like a much bigger threat to world peace than does the Ayatollah Khameini.

Barkley Rosser

Thursday, September 24, 2015

Completely Non-Economics: Chowhound is Dead

It’s a shame, but it was inevitable once founder Jim Leff sold it: sooner or later it was going to be run purely for a profit, and its contribution to US food culture would come to an end.  Miraculously, this fate was evaded for several years, but now it has finally come to pass.  It’s obvious that core community people are jumping ship, and the content is drying up.

I’m a long-time contributor with an attachment to the original vision: Chowhound was not about high-end dining or showering trendy restaurants with even more attention.  No, the goal was to uncover the hidden gems of food culture, with an emphasis on small, regional, “ethnic”, and unexpected.  The drive-in with exceptional fresh-fruit milkshakes.  The ephemeral food trucks, taquerias, fish camps, and what’s-it-doing-here Laotian cafes in small midwestern towns.  Places that weren’t necessarily best of show, but demonstrated that quality doesn’t need ostentation or high prices.

The Chowhound knowledge base was always evolving because “chow-worthy” establishments would come and go, and the factors that made them special would flicker on and off.  The site’s value depended on the constant chatter of contributors who understood the aesthetic and kept their eyes and taste buds open.  Information was organized geographically, since the whole point was suitability to site and serendipity.

Well, it’s gone.  The new format is about selling eyeballs to advertisers.  It is much more difficult to wander through a locality, peering into the thread windows to see what’s on offer.  It’s a whole lot easier to see graphic-intensive advertising.  It’s obvious that traffic has fallen off a cliff, and that the core folks, who understood that Chowhound was a fundamentally different beast from Yelp and had more credibility because of it, have taken a walk.

I’ll miss it.

Monday, September 21, 2015

Big Money Wants Hard Money, Take Two

The recent discussion between Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong and Dean Baker has got me thinking again about why wealthy people and the finance sector are so adamant in favor of hard money.  The reality is not in dispute—this is really their position, in every country and all the time—only the explanation.  The problem is that the components of wealth, mainly equities and bonds, do not always move in lockstep with hard money policies.  In particular, during periods of depressed demand expansionary fiscal and accommodative monetary policy can be good for profits and therefore equity investments.  In fact, this is exactly the political basis for Keynesianism, why it can be a viable political strategy and not just a theoretical curiosum.

Except that the Keynesian class compromise is quite dead.  Big money doesn’t want to hear about any kind of stimulus; it wants hard money, period.

But why?  Brad says big money is blind.  Paul says it’s really the special interest of banks, whose spreads fall during times of low interest rates.  Dean discounts the aggregate demand-profit link and lays the blame on the effect unexpected inflation has on real interest rates.

My scoring puts Brad and Dean slightly ahead.  There is no getting around the fact that much of the argumentation coming from the hard money crowd is simply tendentious and ill-informed.  That suggests an ideological process that interferes with rational, objective thinking.  So: ideology has to be part of the story.  Also, the hard money obsession is not just coming from banks; it seems to reflect the attitude of the very rich in general.  It’s not very convincing to argue, as Krugman does, that non-bank money hardeners get that way by talking too much with bankers.  Meanwhile, however, Baker’s (correct) point about the effect of changes in real interest rates on net creditors has to be put alongside consideration of aggregate demand and profits.  It’s not simple.

I have two hypotheses.  The first is that the Keynesian link between aggregate demand and profit has been attenuated by downward flexibility of the labor share of income.  Profits are doing rather well across the advanced capitalist world despite substandard growth for this very reason.  It isn’t certain that reflation would reverse the declining labor share, but it’s at least plausible that it could.  In that case there is less material basis for a Keynesian cross-class coalition in favor of expansionary policy.

The second is that ideology really is a factor, but that we need to have a somewhat more sophisticated theory of ideology than one usually finds.  The simplest view is that material interests directly drive beliefs, so hard money dogmatism should have its roots in an actual relationship between the value of portfolios and monetary policy.  This appears to be the underlying assumption in the current debate.  A somewhat more complex version, which I support, is that material interests give rise to characteristic problems, and that intellectual frameworks useful for addressing those problems are ideologically favored.  It’s the hammer and nail thing.  In this case, maintaining the value of portfolios, especially those with a significant component of bonds and money-like instruments, in the context of inflation is challenging.  A low-inflation environment is a lot less difficult for wealthy people to cope with.  (This also applies to the risk of devaluation if they have home country bias in their holdings.)  Thus the intellectual tools that are useful in clarifying and minimizing these risks have greater salience and crowd out ways of thinking that address other kinds of problems (like economic growth and employment).  Objectively, this can result in the sort of blindness DeLong describes, but it’s not randomly distributed across the population—it’s a big money thing.  On the other hand, it doesn’t depend on demonstrating that specific soft money policies would be necessarily value-undermining for current portfolios.

These are simply hypotheses.  Political economists should be devising clever ways to empirically test the various explanation.

Economic Reform: An Imaginary Beast?

The mantra of economic reform is on the lips of every academic, consultant and political honcho these days.  Greece, of course, is supposed to understand that structural reform is the only path out of depression, but the other peripheral eurozone countries must not delay reforms either.  Further east, China and Japan have come to a point where only thoroughgoing reforms can enable them to continue to grow and develop.  Developing countries too should recognize that “institutions” ultimately determine economic performance, so their true agenda is reform.  Reform, reform, reform.

Put aside for a moment the bland, indistinct nature of this word reform, which can mean almost anything you want it to.  Suppose for the moment it actually signifies something in particular.  My question is, what country at what time has ever instituted such a reform program with measurable results?  Is there any precedent at all?  Any systematic policy-driven transformation of administrative transparency, economic incentives, organizational effectiveness?  Or is the talk of reform simply a polite way to avoid dealing with the real issues?

Friday, September 18, 2015

China And The Revenge Of The Index Number Problem

Within recent months observers around the world have been in a complete muddle over what is going on with the Chinese economy.  Official Chinese stats say that GDP is growing at a 7 percent annual rate.  Most official observers from places like the World Bank and OECD do not  differ strongly with these numbers and are forecasting a small slowdown of this to somewhere between 6 and 7 percent for 2016.  OTOH, less official sources are all over the place with forecasts and even what the current rate really is, with some even claiming that the Chinese economy is actually in recession, although this certainly seems highly unlikely, even if the 6-7 percent rate forecast is overly optimistic.

Among the reasons for all the controversy and differences in forecasts has to do with apparently wildly different growth rates in different sectors of the Chinese economy.  Now it might be that the underlying microeconomic numbers are being fudged, but whether they are or not, they are indeed wildly diverging.  So, industrial production in July was supposedly down from a year before with other series clearly related to that also  down or performing very poorly.  However, retail sales have supposedly risen over 10 percent in the past year, and various reports have services rising rapidly.  These kinds of divergences are not at all common in most economies most of the time.

Indeed, what this resembles to me is another period of time which there remains great controversy over how rapidly an aggregate economy grew.  I am thinking of the old controversy about how rapidly the Soviet economy grew during the 1930s, the period when Stalin's command plans were initially implemented, marked by a simultaneous rapid growth of industry and a decline of agriculture as it was forcibly collectivized and millions died of starvation in associated famines.  Official Soviet stats had the annual growth rate between 1928 and 1940 was 13.8 percent.  At the opposite extreme we have the estimate of V.I. Khanin that it was more like 3.2 percent, with a full range in between, including what the CIA long believed, and a long and large literature on this.  While there have long been allegations of misreported basic micro data, an often cited culprit in this dispute has been the old index number problem.

Now most economists in western market capitalist economists mostly think about this when thinking about measuring inflation.  Given that in recent years not only has inflation been low in much of the world, but there have also not been wildly different price paths across different sectors, the index number has simply fallen off the radar screens of most observers.  But now it is back with a vengeance in the case of China.  Supposedly China is a market economy of sorts, but it also remains a nominally socialist economy with substantial amounts of government intervention into those markets.  As output paths across sectors are apparently going in strongly different directions, what prices are or would be under other circumstances, we do not know,

I doubt that the underlying micro numbers we are seeing reported from China are as questionable as what was reported in the USSR in the 1930s, but the index number problems in China now with wildly different output trajectories in different sectors, what may have played a major  role in the wildly varying estimates of Soviet growth then may also be playing a factor now in the disagreements over what the current Chinese growth rates are.  If the past is any prologue, we may never have any resolution to what current Chinese GDP growth rates really are.

Barkley Rosser

Tuesday, September 15, 2015

Guess Who

"Only a handful of unreconstructed reactionaries harbor the ugly thought of breaking unions. Only a fool would try to deprive working men and working women of the right to join the union of their choice."
"An industrial society dedicated to the largest possible measure of economic freedom must keep firm faith in collective bargaining. That process is the best method we have for changing and improving labor conditions and thus helping to raise the American standard of living.  
"Healthy collective bargaining requires responsible unions and responsible employers. Irresponsible bargainers cannot get results. Weak unions cannot be responsible. That alone is sufficient reason for having strong unions."